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Who gains from non-collusive corruption?
Abstract
Non-collusive corruption, i.e., corruption that imposes an additional burden on business activity, is
particularly widespread in low-income countries. We build a macroeconomic model with credit market
imperfections and heterogeneous agents to explore the roots and consequences of this type of
corruption. We find that credit market imperfections, by generating rents for the incumbent
entrepreneurs, create strong incentives for corrupt behavior by state officials. However, non-collusive
corruption not only redistributes income from non-officials towards officials but also within the group of
potential entrepreneurs. If borrowing is limited, bribes prevent poorer but talented individuals from
starting a business. But this is likely to benefit those who may enter anyway; the cost of capital is lower
and there is less competition on the goods markets.
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1 Introduction
In its recent World Development Report on poverty the World Bank emphasizes that corruption
is one of the major obstacles in the fight against poverty in the developing world. Indeed, recent
empirical work by Li et al. (2000) has found that corruption hampers growth and increases
inequality. Mauro (1995) has found a negative association between corruption and investment.
Friedman et al. (2000) provide evidence that greater corruption and a large unoﬃcial economy
go hand in hand. Despite the fact that there exist theoretical arguments suggesting that
corruption improves welfare (e.g., Leﬀ, 1964), the academic discussion has largely reached a
consensus that, in practice, a dishonest bureaucracy deteriorates eﬃciency.
In the light of its adverse eﬀects on economic performance and poverty reduction in the
developing world it is astonishing that extensive corruption is so persistent in many of the low-
income countries. Why is a corrupt bureaucracy not fought by a government exactly appointed
to do so? There might be a simple reason if corruption is mutually beneficial between the oﬃcial
and his client. As Bardhan (1997) underlines, neither the oﬃcial nor the private agent has an
incentive to report or protest in that case. This means that collusive corruption is insidious
and diﬃcult to detect and therefore likely to be persistent. However, corruption is often not
mutually beneficial between the oﬃcial and the private agent but imposes additional costs in
particular on firms. Rose-Ackerman (1999, pp. 15-7) reviews anecdotal evidence showing that
non-collusive corruption, i.e., corruption that benefits only the dishonest oﬃcials,1 increases
the costs of engaging in economic activity dramatically. In Section 2 we show that this kind
of corruption is pervasive throughout the less developed world.
The aim of the theoretical part of this paper is to shed light on the forces behind persis-
tent corruption without theft. We explore its distributional consequences in a macroeconomic
model with market imperfections and heterogeneous agents. In particular, we analyze the im-
pact of bribery on individual investment opportunities and on aggregate variables such as the
equilibrium interest rate in presence of imperfections on the credit and on the goods markets.
In poorer countries especially, such market imperfections are widespread (e.g., Levine, 1997;
Rodrik, 1988). So far, the theoretical literature has largely neglected the distributional eﬀects
of corruption via its impact on factor rewards or on goods prices. However, it turns out that
1Corruption without theft (from the government) in the terminology of Shleifer and Vishny (1993). Henceforth
”corruption without theft” and ”non-collusive corruption” are treated as synonyms.
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taking into account these general equilibrium eﬀects is important for understanding how the
costs and benefits of corruption are distributed among the economic groups in society.2
Our model focuses on non-collusive corruption taking place between firms and lower-level
bureaucracy. We assume that a potential entrepreneur has to complete bureaucratic procedures
to set up a business and, crucially, that the oﬃcials have some discretion over the government
good (e.g., a ”business license”) associated with the procedures. Specifically, we assume that
expected punishment in case of demanding bribes is comparatively low and that there is only
a single oﬃcial per jurisdiction to provide the business license. As a result, a potential en-
trepreneur may be forced to bribe the oﬃcial in order to complete the procedures and to get
the license. After having received the license, an entrepreneur is free to invest. The technology
- which is identical across agents - is non-convex in the sense that a minimum investment is
required to produce output. Provided that the minimum scale requirement is satisfied, the
technology exhibits constant returns to scale in capital. Further, there exists an economy-wide
capital market that may be imperfect because of imperfect enforcement of credit contracts.
In that case, the initial capital endowment serves as collateral determining how much can be
borrowed and, eventually, who runs an enterprise and who becomes a lender.
Our analysis provides two main results. First, the credit market imperfection guarantees
supra-normal profits to the entrepreneurs who may enter the markets, and the existence of such
rents induces the oﬃcials to demand bribes. By contrast, with a well-functioning financial
system, the rents are low or entirely absent; from an oﬃcial’s viewpoint, it is optimal to
demand only moderate bribes or not to commit corrupt acts at all under these circumstances.
Interestingly, however, the relationship between contract enforcement and the equilibrium bribe
is not unambiguous. If enforcement improves from a low level, the bribe may rise in the first
place. Afterwards it stays constant and then starts falling.
The second result is that non-collusive corruption not only redistributes income from non-
oﬃcials towards oﬃcials but may also lead to redistribution among non-oﬃcials. In particular,
the ”middle class” suﬀers most from (more) corruption whereas the wealthiest entrepreneurs
are less aﬀected or even win. These distributional consequences are driven by the fact that,
2Using a reduced-form (and partial-analytic) approach, Bliss and Di Tella (1997) discuss the impact of
more competition on goods prices, firm profits, and corrupt payments. However, consistent with the set-up
of their model, they do not address distributional consequences of corruption within the group of (potential)
entrepreneurs.
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under imperfect credit, wealth serves as a collateral determining how much can be borrowed
on the credit market. Paying bribes reduces this collateral so that a potential entrepreneur
may borrow less if the bureaucrats demand higher bribes. More severe credit restrictions
are especially harmful for individuals that have to rely on external funds to finance a plant
of minimal size. For some of the members of this ”middle class” - the poorest among them -
entrepreneurship will no longer be viable option. This crowding-out eﬀect, in turn, benefits the
entrepreneurs who stay in the market. Aggregate capital demand falls so that the cost of capital
of the remaining entrepreneurs goes down. Lower capital costs benefit the large borrowers
strongest. The group of the largest borrowers even wins because this general equilibrium
eﬀect is strong enough to more than compensate for the higher bribe costs. Under imperfect
credit, the largest borrowers are the most aﬄuent individuals because ex ante wealth plays the
role of a collateral. The distributional consequences among non-oﬃcials are amplified if the
crowding-out eﬀect reduces the extent of competition on the product markets.
We suggest that our results may add to a better understanding of persistent non-collusive
corruption. The argumentation evolves along two separate but related lines. First, we point to
the fact that credit market imperfections create rents for the incumbent entrepreneurs. These
rents may be partially extracted by corruptible oﬃcials if the sanctions against bribery are
imperfect. Since the rents tend to be the lower the better the credit market works, we find
that the bribe payments are lower in financially advanced economies - even if less and more
advanced countries prosecuted corruption with the same rigor. Put diﬀerently, (near-)perfect
enforcement of credit contracts erodes the oﬃcial’s power to extract rents. Second, the analysis
highlights that non-collusive corruption acts as a barrier to entry if credit contracts are poorly
enforced; it points to the fact that these barriers may benefit the most aﬄuent entrepreneurs
via a general equilibrium channel. Hence, it may be that this group has an incentive to oppose
an eﬀective reform of the state bureaucracy or the legal system.3 Clearly, reducing corruption
is a diﬃcult task, a fact that is mirrored by the vast literature on that subject (for a survey
see Bardhan, 1997). Controlling collusive corruption is particularly non-trivial because of its
secret nature.4 The argument here is that even if a well-intentioned government perfectly knew
3Li, Squire, and Zou (1998), among others, provide evidence that in countries with weak democratic institu-
tions the government is indeed ”captured” by the rich.
4For instance, Mookherjee and Png (1995) show that a more severe punishment on an inspector who colludes
with a private firm against the regulator may even raise the bribes.
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how to reduce the most visible and non-collusive forms of corruption, it might have diﬃculties
to do so because of political economy reasons.
Our work is part of the literature on the macro-determinates of corruption (e.g., Ades and
Di Tella, 1997, 1999; Treisman, 2000; Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000; Fisman and Gatti, 2002).
It is most closely related to the contributions by Ades and Di Tella who emphasize that the
existence of rents, created, e.g., by product market imperfections, may foster corruption. Rents
are also crucial for the existence of corruption in the present paper. We depart from Ades and
Di Tella’s work, however, by stressing that credit market imperfections may be an important
source of rents. Moreover, we analyze the impact of bribery on equilibrium factor prices and
goods prices. This, in turn, allows us to assess the distributional consequences of corruption
within the group of potential entrepreneurs. There is also a close link to Bliss and Di Tella
(1997). As in their model, corruption may alter the extent of competition on the goods market
in the present framework. An important diﬀerence lies again in the emphasis we put on the
interaction between corruption and credit market imperfections.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we shortly discuss diﬀerent types
of corruption and provide some evidence suggesting that non-collusive corruption is pervasive
in the less developed world. Section 3 sets up the model and examines the static equilibrium.
The distributional consequences of corruption under imperfect credit are explored in Section
4. In Section 5 we discuss an extension of the basic model in which more corruption lowers
the extent of competition on the goods markets. Section 6 concludes.
2 Types of Corruption
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) distinguish two types of corruption. First, in the case without theft
(from the government), the oﬃcial does not hide the transaction with a private agent and
passes the transaction’s price to the government but charges something extra for himself. This
means that the oﬃcial imposes additional costs on the private agent. A well-known example of
corruption without theft is provided by De Soto’s (1989) study of entry regulation in Peru in
the early 1980s. At that time, there were eleven requirements for setting up a small industry.
In an experiment, a potential entrepreneur was asked for additional payments on ten occasions.
Refusing to pay the bribes resulted in administrative delays of considerable length or made it
simply impossible to get the government good associated with the procedures. Second, in the
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case with theft, the oﬃcial sells the government good for private gain (usually at a price lower
than the government price) and hides the transaction. Further examples of corruption with
theft (i.e., collusive corruption) include the case of bribing oﬃcials to circumvent pollution
control laws or, of course, cases of bribing bureaucrats to win profitable contracts with the
government. In sharing a rent at the expense of the public, corruption with theft is beneficial
for the oﬃcial and the private individual.
Many authors, among them Shleifer and Vishny (1993, p. 604) and Bardhan (1997, p.
1334), argue that we should expect collusive corruption to be more persistent and widespread
than non-collusive since in the case with theft the interests of the oﬃcial and the private agent
are aligned and there are no incentives to protest. Although there is a lot of anecdotal evidence
suggesting that non-collusive corruption is also widespread and persistent, it is diﬃcult to make
a sound judgment from an empirical point of view. The problem is the availability of reliable
cross-country and time-series data. Corruption perception indices which are available for a
large cross-section of countries (and for two decades) do not explicitly deal with collusive
or non-collusive corruption.5 However, there exists some cross-country data allowing us to
construct proxies for both non-collusive and collusive corruption in early 2000.
In its attempt to measure ”Conditions for Business Operation and Growth”, the World
Bank (World Business Environment Survey [WBES], 2000) recently asked over 10,000 firms
in 80 countries questions about corruption. Inter alia, firm managers were asked whether
it is common for firms in their line of business to have to pay some irregular ”additional
payments” to get things done, and, after having done the ”additional payment”, whether
another governmental oﬃcial will subsequently require an ”additional payments” for the same
service. As a third question, the managers had to specify, when doing business with the
government, how much of the contract value a firm in their industry would typically oﬀer in
additional or unoﬃcial payments to secure the contract.
In pursuing corruption along the lines of the first and the second question, an oﬃcial steals
from private firms and not from the government because he asks for irregular ”additional
payments” to provide a governmental service. Thus, the responses (”always”, ”mostly”, ”fre-
5For instance, the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (TI-CPI) is constructed from
seven component surveys. The subjects asked about in these component surveys range from ”How do you rate
corruption in terms of its quality or contribution to the overall living/working environment?” to the ”frequency
of bribing” in various contexts.
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quently”, ”sometimes”, ”seldom”, ”never”) to these questions are likely to mirror the extent of
non-collusive corruption. As a plausible measure for non-collusive corruption we propose the
share of firms responding ”never” or ”seldom” to the first question. The range of the measures
is [0,1], with 1 indicating least corruption. It may be, of course, that paying such additional
fees (illegally) reduces red tape or makes an inspector overlook some violation of regulations.
Then, corruption may be beneficial to the entrepreneur as well. To assess whether this concern
constitutes a severe problem, we construct a measure for ”multiple bribing” using the sec-
ond question. The measure gives the fraction of firms responding ”never” or ”seldom” when
asked whether multiple bribing is common. The two measures turn out to be highly correlated
(Spearman’s rank correlation is 0.81). Hence, in countries where irregular additional payments
are common, an entrepreneur often has to deal with two or even more corrupt oﬃcials. We take
this as evidence that paying corrupt fees indeed imposes additional costs on entrepreneurs.
The responses to the third question (”zero”, ”up to 5 %”, ”6 to 10 %”, ”11 to 15 %”, ”16
to 20 %”, ”more than 20 %”), by contrast, may serve as a measure for the level of collusive
corruption. It is well known that corruption in the awarding of major contracts inflates the
costs of public projects. Therefore, it appears reasonable to subsume this type of corruption
under corruption with theft. As a plausible measure we propose the share of firms responding
”zero” or ”up to 5 %”. Again, the range of the measures is [0,1], with 1 indicating least
corruption.
Tables 1 and 2 here.
Table 1 shows rank correlations between diﬀerent measures of corruption. The correlation
between our simple measure of non-collusive corruption and the Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index (TI-CPI) 2001 is extremely high. Spearman’s rank correlation
is about 0.81 whereas the correlation between the measure for collusive corruption and the
TI-CPI 2001 is only about 0.58. In addition, running a regression with the TI-CPI 2001
as dependent variable and our measures for both collusive and non-collusive corruption as
independent variables shows that non-collusive corruption explains a large share of the variance
in the TI-CPI 2001 (see Table 2). A one standard deviation increase in the measure for non-
collusive corruption increases the TI-CPI by 1.35 points (78 % of a standard deviation) whereas
the same figure for collusive corruption is only about 0.37 points (19 % of a standard deviation).
These results suggest that there is a close relationship between the contemporaneous perception
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of corruption as, for instance, reported in the TI-CPI and the extent of non-collusive corruption.
Note that the correlations qualitatively persist even if we use average TI scores for earlier
periods, in particular for the 1988-91 and the 1980-85 spells (see Table 1). This is not surprising
because the rankings based on perceived corruption are strongly correlated across time.6
All in all, from the evidence presented here it appears that persistent non-collusive cor-
ruption is an important part of the whole corruption problem in a given country. Everyday
corruption - by inflating the cost of engaging in economic activity - seems to shape strongly
whether a country is perceived to be more or less corrupt.
Many authors have found a close negative relationship between economic development
and the level of perceived corruption. Given the strong correlation between our measure for
non-collusive corruption and the TI-CPI 2001 it comes not as a surprise that this correlation
prevails when we plot log GDP per capita (as a measure for economic development) on the
horizontal axis and our measure for non-collusive corruption on the vertical axis (Figure 1).
Figure 1 here.
In what follows we argue that diﬀerences in the extents of non-collusive corruption between
poor and rich countries may reflect diﬀerences in how well (credit) markets work.
3 The Model
3.1 Basic Assumptions
Individuals. We consider a closed economy that is populated by a continuum of individuals
of measure 2. Utility is linear so that the individuals seek to maximize their ex post wealth.
The population consists out of two groups of equal size, the potential entrepreneurs and the
oﬃcials. The potential entrepreneurs (which are of measure 1) are heterogeneous with respect
to their ex ante wealth endowment w but otherwise identical. The endowments are distributed
according to the continuous distribution functionG(w). The oﬃcials (which are also of measure
1) do not receive an ex ante wealth endowment.
Technology. A potential entrepreneur may invest k units consisting of his own wealth
and, possibly, borrowed funds into an ”investment project”. Each capital unit is then trans-
formed into R units of the homogenous good. However, the technology is characterized by
6See also Treisman (2000), pp. 407-412, on that issue.
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a non-convexity in the sense that a potential entrepreneur has to invest an amount that is
higher than some specific threshold level. In particular, there is a minimum requirement of κ
capital units to start an investment project. With a lower level of input, the project does not
generate any returns. Hence, provided that the minimum scale requirement is satisfied, the
technology exhibits constant returns to scale. There is also a second technology, call it ”back-
yard project”, that is convex and stands open to all individuals. However, backyard projects
are less productive than ordinary investment projects. One capital unit produces only r < R
units of the homogenous good. The homogenous good is sold on a competitive goods market.
Its price is normalized to unity.
From now onwards, we use the following terminology. A potential entrepreneur becomes
an entrepreneur if he manages an investment project. Moreover, the expressions investment
project and firm are treated synonymously.
Credit Market. Beside the two physical investment opportunities, all agents may become
lenders on an economy-wide credit market. The endogenously determined interest rate is ρ. In
equilibrium, ρ must be at least as high as r because of the existence of the backyard project.
Hence, only entrepreneurs may find it attractive to borrow.
The credit market is competitive in the sense that the individuals take the interest rate ρ
as given. However, there may be a credit market imperfection due to imperfect enforcement of
credit contracts. In particular, an entrepreneur can renege on the credit contract that specifies
a repayment obligation (which is given by the amount of credit times ρ) by incurring some
costs. In case of default, the entrepreneur loses a fraction λ ∈ (0, 1] of his revenue. A λ close to
0 stands for a very eﬃcient expropriation technology. By contrast, a value close to 1 indicates
strong creditor protection.7 We further assume that a borrower will default if he is strictly
better oﬀ by doing so. Taking into account the borrowers’ incentives, the lenders will give
credit only up to the point where a specific borrower is exactly indiﬀerent between fulfilling
the contract and reneging on the contract. This is the case if the repayment obligation equals
the cost of default, λRk. Hence, an entrepreneur investing k units of capital gets a maximum
credit of λRρ k capital units. Note that in equilibrium default will not occur. The capital market
is imperfect because it is possible to default.
Corruption. The backyard projects are not subject to regulation, while the high-return
7In modelling the capital market imperfection we follow Matsuyama (2000).
9
investment projects are. In order to start an investment project, an entrepreneur has to
undertake bureaucratic procedures to get a de iure costless business license. However, the
oﬃcials have some eﬀective property rights over the licenses so that - as described in De Soto’s
(1989) study on business regulation - an oﬃcial may deny an entrepreneur the licences if the
latter refuses to pay bribes. Note that we model corruption as of the non-collusive type. The
bribes simply impose an additional burden on the entrepreneurs.
To fix ideas, let us assume that there is exactly one potential entrepreneur and one oﬃcial
per jurisdiction so that each oﬃcial is a monopoly supplier of the license. Let us further
assume that each oﬃcial knows the wealth distribution G(w) and the interest rate ρ but, just
like in Bliss and Di Tella (1997), that he cannot observe individual variables such as the wealth
endowment of his particular entrepreneur. Accordingly, all potential entrepreneurs are oﬀered
the license at the same price b ≥ 0.8 Each potential entrepreneur either accepts or refuses
to pay the bribe. To refuse means definitively not managing a high-yield investment project.
With respect to the prosecution of corruption, we follow the approach taken by Rose-Ackerman
(1975) and assume that the oﬃcials face an expected punishment which increases in the level
of the bribe demanded. More formally, a corrupt oﬃcial is detected and punished ex post with
an exogenous probability π > 0. In case of detection, the punishment is given by ρ · µ(b) with
µ0(b) > 0 and µ00(b) > 0. Note that both π and µ(b) are independent of whether the bribe
has been paid or not. All what matters is whether a bribe has been demanded or not. The
proceeds of the punishments are equally distributed among the population.
Each oﬃcial is assumed to choose b in order to maximize his expected ex post wealth.
Since an oﬃcial may not run an own firm, he invests the earned bribe payment on the credit
market such that the ex post wealth function is given by ρ times the expected bribe payment
minus the expected punishment.9 Note, finally, that a single oﬃcial’s action may not aﬀect
aggregate capital demand. Demanding bribes clearly influences the investment decision of
8The relationship between the potential entrepreneurs and the oﬃcials is designed in a rather simple way so
that the (bribe/revenue)-ratio decreases strongly in the firm size. However, this is not to claim that there is
no room for bargaining over the level of the bribe in reality. In the previous version of the paper (Foellmi and
Oechslin, 2003), we discuss a ”bribe tariﬀ” that is increasing but concave in the entrepreneur’s wealth (which
seems to be consistent with the empirical findings; see, e.g., Clarke and Xu, 2002). Yet, the distributional
consequences in this more general case are qualitatively similar to those in the simpler case discussed here.
9Obviously, with this type of punishment, the ex post wealth of an oﬃcial may become negative. However,
this is unproblematic because of the linear utility function.
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the single entrepreneur that is under the oﬃcial’s control. However, since the entrepreneur
is only of measure zero with respect to the whole economy, his response to corruption leaves
aggregate capital demand unchanged. From this, we conclude that a single oﬃcial’s action is
also irrelevant with respect to the equilibrium cost of capital.
3.2 Static Equilibrium
This subsection characterizes the equilibrium. We consider the case of an imperfect credit
market first.
λ < 1. The description of the equilibrium under imperfect credit involves three steps. In
step one, we discuss the entrepreneurs’ optimal behavior for a given bribe. Step two solves the
oﬃcials’ optimization problem. In determining the optimal bribe, an oﬃcial takes into account
the behavior of the entrepreneurs as derived in step one. Finally, in step three, the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium is established.
Consider an entrepreneur investing k ≥ κ units into an investment project. Assume further
that the entrepreneur faces bribe costs of b ≥ 0 and that λR < ρ ≤ R. Then, the minimum
amount of own capital required to do such an investment is determined by wmin = k+ b− λRρ k
where λRρ k is the maximum amount of credit the entrepreneur gets. Hence, we have
wmin(k) = b+
µ
1− λR
ρ
¶
k > 0. (1)
Denote by kmax(w) the inverse function of wmin(k), i.e., kmax(w) relates an entrepreneur’s
maximum investment to his wealth endowment. By manipulating equation (1) we get
kmax(w) =
µ
1− λR
ρ
¶−1
(w − b) > 0. (2)
Note that an additional unit of (net) ex ante wealth, (w − b), rises kmax by more than one
unit since ρ > λR. Hence, the net capital stock owned by the entrepreneur himself plays the
role of a collateral in the sense that a higher wealth endowment allows for higher borrowing.
This is due to the assumption that credit contracts are imperfectly enforced. Equation (2)
also reveals the role of non-collusive corruption under imperfect credit markets. Paying bribes
hampers access to credit by reducing the value of the entrepreneur’s ”collateral”.
Which individuals choose to run a firm? Entrepreneurship is a viable option for all potential
entrepreneurs who are able to invest at least κ capital units. Using equation (1), we can
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determine the wealth level, denote it by ew1, that enables an individual to invest exactly κ unit
of capital:
ew1 ≡ wmin(κ) = b+µ1− λRρ
¶
κ. (3)
The intuition of equation (3) is easy to grasp. The maximum amount that an entrepreneur
can borrow is given by λRρ k. A higher interest rate, a less severe punishment in case of default,
and a lower productivity reduce the maximum amount of credit. Thus, the cutoﬀ-level must
rise in ρ and fall in λ and in R. A higher total bribe b translates one-to-one into an increase
of ew1 since the bribes must be paid ex ante.
It remains, however, to determine whether all individuals with wealth w ≥ ew1 choose
to manage a firm in equilibrium. It is clear that all entrepreneurs will fully exploit their
credit opportunities since, apart from the limiting case ρ = R, the rate at which they can
borrow lies below the marginal productivity of capital. Consequently, the ex post wealth of an
entrepreneur, i.e., the entrepreneur’s wealth after the market interactions have taken place, is
given by WE = Rkmax − ρλRρ k. Simplifying results in
WE(w) = (1− λ)Rkmax (4)
=
(1− λ)R
1− λRρ
(w − b) .
The alternative occupational choice, that is acting as a lender and/or investing into a backyard
project, yields an ex post wealth of WL(w) = wmax{ρ, r} = wρ.10 Denote by ew2 the wealth
level at which an individual is exactly indiﬀerent between entrepreneurship and the alternative
occupation. This threshold level is determined by WE( ew2) =WL( ew2). Solving for ew2 yields
ew2 = (1− λ)R
R− ρ b. (5)
Other things equal, a higher borrowing rate and a higher bribe make entrepreneurship less
attractive. Since entrepreneurs with a low initial wealth endowment are very restricted in
taking advantage of the gap between the productivity of capital and the credit costs, the poorest
of them will find it advantageous to change occupation in response to such a worsening. Hence,ew2 must rise in those two arguments. Finally, in case of R = ρ, we see that entrepreneurship
will only be chosen if b = 0 so that the potential entrepreneurs are exactly indiﬀerent between
running a firm or become a lender. To summarize (proof in the text),
10A non-entrepreneur is never forced to lend at a rate below r because of the existence of the backyard project.
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Lemma 1 Let λR < ρ ≤ R. Then, all individuals with w ≥ ew ≡ max{ ew1, ew2} are en-
trepreneurs. Each entrepreneur invests the maximum possible amount, kmax(w).
We are now able to solve the oﬃcials’ optimization problem. Since an oﬃcial cannot observe
the wealth endowment of the entrepreneur that is located in his jurisdiction, the expected return
from demanding a bribe b is ρ · [1−G ( ew(b))] b. The expected cost is given by ρ · πµ(b). Note
further that - as pointed out above - the interest rate ρ is a constant from the perspective of
a single oﬃcial. Hence, the (among oﬃcials identical) optimization problem can be written as
max
b
{[1−G ( ew(b))] b− πµ(b)} .
A suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for the oﬃcials’ objective function to be quasi-concave
is that the hazard rate of the distribution function G is non-decreasing (see Lemma 2 below).
To avoid multiple equilibria, we assume that this condition holds.11 Then, the optimal bribe,
denote it by b(ρ), is 0 if 1−G
³h
1− λRρ
i
κ
´
− πµ0(0) ≤ 0. Otherwise, the above maximization
problem has an interior solution and the first order condition is given by
1−G( ew) = G0( ew)∂ ew
∂b
b+ πµ0(b). (6)
Condition (6) can be easily interpreted. The left-hand side shows the expected gain of a
marginal increase in bribes. The right-hand side denotes the expected loss. It contains two
components. The first component mirrors the fact that a higher bribe may drive a potential
entrepreneur out of business. In that case, the oﬃcial loses the whole bribe b. The second
component indicates the rise in the expected punishment.
Lemma 2 Let λR < ρ ≤ R. Then, if the hazard rate of G is non-decreasing in ew, the above
maximization problem has a unique solution b(ρ).
Proof. See Appendix.
We complete our description of the equilibrium by deriving gross capital demand and gross
capital supply. The former variable, KD, equals the sum over all entrepreneurial firm sizes.
Remembering equation (2) and Lemma (1), gross capital demand can be written as
KD(ρ) =
1
1− λRρ
Z ∞
max{ ew1, ew2} [w − b(ρ)]G
0(w)dw. (7)
11The Gamma distribution, for instance, that has been used in the study of the income or wealth distribution
satisfies this condition under certain restrictions.
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In the remainder of this paper we restrict our attention to parameter constellations under
which the case ew2 > ew1 may never occur. Intuitively, this requires the optimal bribe to be 0
if ρ is close to R and the minimum investment κ to be large enough such that the bribe has
a relatively low weight once one can take advantage of entrepreneurship. Note, however, that
ruling out the possibility of ew2 > ew1 is not critical to the major implications of our model.
Yet, it simplifies the further exposition to a large extent.
Lemma 3 Suppose that (i) λ < 1, (ii) 1−G (κ {1− λ})− πµ0(0) < 0, and (iii) κ > κ, where
κ is defined in the proof. Then, KD is infinite if ρ ≤ λR and decreases in ρ for λR < ρ < R.
At ρ = R, the KD-curve is horizontal. If ρ > R, KD equals zero. Finally, the optimal bribe
decreases in ρ and reaches 0 at ρ0 ∈ [λR,R), where ρ0 is defined in the proof.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind the above Lemma is as follows. Given the bribe, a rise in the cost of
capital increases ew1 and decreases kmax(w) since the incentives to default are stronger with a
higher ρ. Each of these adjustments lowers gross capital demand. However, the adverse eﬀect
on capital demand is softened by the fact that the oﬃcials demand lower bribes. Why is that
the case? A higher interest rate means that the probability of selling a license decreases when
the bribe is kept unchanged. Hence, it is optimal to lower the bribe in order to soften this
decline and to reduce the expected punishment. Moreover, since ew1 < ew2 always holds, we
know that the optimal bribe is zero before the interest rate reaches R.
Figure 2 here.
It remains to discuss gross capital supply, KS . In case of ρ > r, we have KS = K¯ =R∞
0 wG
0(w)dw since nobody will invest into a backyard project. If ρ = r, a potential lender
is indiﬀerent between investing into a backyard project or lending. Finally, in case of ρ < r,
there are no lenders at all since the backyard project yields a strictly higher return. The credit
market equilibrium is now immediately characterized. If the KD(ρ)−schedule intersects with
the vertical part of the gross capital supply schedule, as it is depicted in Figure 2, we have
ρ∗ > r (where ρ∗ denotes the equilibrium borrowing rate), and the economy-wide capital stock
is allocated to high-yield investment projects. Otherwise, we have ρ∗ = r, and gross capital
supply is determined by KD(r) ≤ K¯. To conclude (proof in the text),
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Proposition 1 Suppose that the conditions stated in Lemma 3 hold. Then, there exists a
unique equilibrium interest rate ρ∗. In addition, the oﬃcials demand a positive bribe in equi-
librium if ρ∗ < ρ0.
It is further interesting to discuss how the non-oﬃcials’ ex post wealth depends on ex ante
wealth in an equilibrium with ρ∗ < R. As illustrated in Figure 3, the non-oﬃcials are lenders
up to a wealth endowment of ew1((ρ∗, b(ρ∗)) , and their ex post wealth is given by ρ∗ ·w.
Figure 3 here.
Then, at w = ew1((ρ∗, b(ρ∗)), the ex post wealth jumps to (1 − λ)Rκ and is from now on
given by WE(w) = (1− λ)Rkmax(w). It is easy to check that ∂W
E(w)
∂w > R. The reason for
the high entrepreneurial return is that the equilibrium borrowing rate lies below the marginal
product of capital. Then, since own wealth weakens the borrowing constraint, one more unit
of own capital leads to an extra net return that is equal to the additional amount of credit
times (R− ρ∗).12 The existence of rents is the reason why the oﬃcials may demand bribes in
equilibrium without inducing all potential entrepreneurs to choose the alternative occupation.
λ = 1. Consider now the benchmark case of perfect enforcement of credit contracts. Under
these circumstances, it never pays for a borrower to default and the capital endowment no
longer serves as a collateral. Consequently, every potential entrepreneur can borrow up to an
infinitely large amount of capital. This fact has important implications for the production
structure and for the equilibrium extent of corruption. To see this, suppose that a potential
entrepreneur (investing k capital units) faces a finite cost b ≥ 0 in order to obtain the business
license. Then, the net profit per capital unit is given by Rk−ρk−bk . This expression approaches
R − ρ as k goes to infinity. Hence, in case of R − ρ > 0, such an entrepreneur could generate
an infinitely high ex post wealth by borrowing very large sums. But since every potential
entrepreneur has the possibility to do so, competition would drive the interest rate up to R.
Hence, in an equilibrium, each operating firm borrows up to a positive fraction of the economy-
wide capital endowment and faces an interest rate of R. Further, as the mass of individuals
to buy a business license is of measure zero with respect to the whole population of potential
12In a sample of small and medium-sized firms in India, Banerjee and Duflo (2004) find indeed a large gap
between the marginal product and the interest rate paid on the marginal capital unit. This highlights the
importance of credit constraints in a developing country setting.
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entrepreneurs, the probability of selling a license is zero from the perspective of a particular
oﬃcial. But then, the optimal bribe is also zero since oﬀering a license at a positive price
is associated with a positive expected punishment. Perfect contract enforcement erodes the
oﬃcials power to extract bribes.
3.3 Corruption and Financial Development
Knowing that perfect enforcement eradicates corruption, it is interesting to ask whether im-
proving enforcement (without going all the way to a perfect market) is an appropriate measure
to fight bribery. Interestingly, the relationship turns out to be ambiguous.
Proposition 2 The relationship between the optimal bribe b and the level of financial devel-
opment λ is hump-shaped.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is as follows. Initially, at low levels of λ (i.e., with ρ = r), better enforcement
unambiguously softens the entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraint. The reason is that the interest
rate does not respond to higher capital demand since capital supply is perfectly elastic. As a
result, the oﬃcials face a higher probability of being matched with a prospective entrepreneur
and hence are induced to demand higher bribes, other things equal. Later on (i.e., with ρ > r),
improving contract enforcement does no longer create new entrepreneurs because the borrowing
constraint is unchanged; better enforcement induces the interest rate to rise, and the two eﬀects
are exactly oﬀsetting with respect to the entrepreneurs’ borrowing capacity. Consequently, the
oﬃcials keep the level of graft unchanged. Finally, for λ close to 1, the probability of facing a
prospective entrepreneur and hence the optimal bribe decrease because becoming a lender is
attractive for more and more individuals ( ew2 is relevant). Intuitively, strong creditor protection
allows individuals to take advantage of high-yield investment opportunities outside their own
firm. Hence, demanding bribes easily induces them to invest somewhere else. In the limit case,
the probability of being matched with an entrepreneur who is willing to pay a bribe approaches
zero so that it is optimal not to demand bribes at all when contract enforcement is perfect. Note
that there is some empirical support for a negative relationship between bribe payments and
the return to outside investment opportunities. Svensson (2003) finds that a firm’s ”refusal
power”, measured by the alternative return to capital, is an important determinant of how
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much a firm has to pay.
4 Corruption and Redistribution
This section analyzes the impact of a more severe prosecution of corruption (i.e., a rise in π)
on the equilibrium bribe and on the ex post wealth of the non-oﬃcials under imperfect credit.
Throughout the following analysis, we look only at equilibria with a positive optimal bribe.
Consider the oﬃcials’ reaction to a marginal increase in π. Keeping ρ constant and diﬀer-
entiating the first order condition (6) with respect to π yields
∂b
∂π
= − µ
0(b)
2G0( ew1) +G00( ew1)b+ πµ00(b) < 0.
Note that the denominator of the above expression is strictly positive (such that ∂b∂π is negative)
as a result of the monotone hazard rate condition. Hence, for a given ρ, ew1 declines and
kmax(w) rises as π goes up. Accordingly, the KD-curve shifts to the right. We conclude that
the equilibrium interest rate rises if ρ∗ > r (as shown in Figure 4) or stays constant if the
KD-curve intersects the gross capital supply schedule in the horizontal part (i.e., if ρ∗ = r).
Figure 4 here.
Intuitively, a more severe prosecution of corruption lowers the optimal bribe so that the net
ex ante wealth endowment, (w − b), increases. But since (w− b) plays the role of a collateral,
gross capital demand rises. Hence, unless gross capital supply is perfectly elastic, the interest
rate must rise as well. Note finally that the direct eﬀect of a rise in π is enforced through an
indirect eﬀect operating through the equilibrium interest rate in case of ρ∗ > r. From Lemma
3 we know that a higher interest rate induces the oﬃcials to lower the bribes even further. To
summarize (proof in the text),
Proposition 3 Consider an equilibrium with b(ρ∗) > 0. Then, a rise in π reduces the equilib-
rium bribe. In addition, the interest rate increases unless capital supply is perfectly elastic.
In what follows we analyze the distributional consequences of decreasing corruption (i.e.,
of a rise in π).
ρ∗> r. Consider the case of perfectly inelastic capital supply first. The Lemma below shows
that reducing corruption - despite leading to higher capital costs - softens the credit restrictions
for potential entrepreneurs with an ex ante wealth endowment close to ew1.
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Lemma 4 Consider an equilibrium with b(ρ∗) > 0 and ρ∗ > r. Then, d ew1dπ < 0. In addition,
there exists a bw > ew1 such that dkmax(w)dπ > 0 for w < bw and dkmax(w)dπ < 0 for w > bw.
Proof. See Appendix.
The distributional consequences of a higher π are now most easily discussed by use of
Figure 5 which combines the information from Proposition 3 and Lemma 4. The figure shows
the ex post wealth function before and after the change. As a consequence of the rise in
ρ, the graph becomes steeper for lenders (whose ex post wealth equals ρw) and flatter for
entrepreneurs (whose ex post wealth is given by equation 4). Note, however, that the two
graphs intersect at an ex ante wealth level bw that exceeds ewold1 since kmax( ewold1 ) is higher in
the new situation. According to Figure 5, all initial lenders are better oﬀ. Most of them (those
in the interval (0, ewnew1 )) win moderately and only indirectly because the equilibrium interest
rate rises. However, some of them (those in the interval [ ewnew1 , ewold1 )) experience a large gain
because the lower bribe allows them to take advantage of entrepreneurship.
Figure 5 here.
The group of initial entrepreneurs is divided into two fractions. Entrepreneurs with a wealth
endowment close to ewold1 win. As they can borrow relatively little anyway, the reduction of
the bribe has a strong positive impact on their borrowing opportunities so that the negative
impact of higher capital costs is more than compensated. Since their ex post wealth is given
by (1 − λ)Rkmax, they are definitively better oﬀ. By contrast, entrepreneurs with a wealth
endowment above bw lose. Unlike the individuals belonging to the ”middle class”, the aﬄuent
entrepreneurs borrow a lot so that the reduction of the bribe is small relative to the rise in
the costs of borrowing. Consequently, their access to credit worsens. Moreover, it is not
only possible that the most aﬄuent individuals lose but it is certain. Since there are more
entrepreneurs than before and some of the poorer original entrepreneurs invest more, a positive
mass of the wealthiest entrepreneurs must invest less to restore the equality of capital demand
and (inelastic) capital supply. To summarize (proof in the text),
Proposition 4 Consider an equilibrium with b(ρ∗) > 0 and ρ∗ > r. Then, a rise in π benefits
all initial lenders and all entrepreneurs running relatively small firms. In contrast, the most
aﬄuent entrepreneurs in the economy lose.
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These distributional eﬀects would remain largely intact if we considered a gross capital
supply schedule that is not vertical but has a positive slope.13 In such a situation again, a rise
in π shifts the KD-curve to the right and raises the interest rate so that all initial lenders win.
Moreover, parallel reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 4 shows that the initial entrepreneurs
belonging to the ”middle class” fare better as well. Finally, again, entrepreneurs with a wealth
endowment above some threshold level bw lose because they can invest less. However, since a
higher interest rate increases capital supply, it is no longer certain that a positive mass of the
richest entrepreneurs invests (and therefore earns) less in the new equilibrium.
ρ∗= r. Suppose now that the interest rate equals r such that gross capital supply is perfectly
elastic. This situation is likely to arise if the expected penalty for corruption is ceteris paribus
low and so that the optimal bribe is high. High bribes, in turn, go together with low gross
capital demand. Since a marginal rise of π leaves the interest rate unchanged but decreases the
optimal bribe, it is immediately clear that the fraction of entrepreneurs increases
³
d ew1
dπ < 0
´
and
that all original entrepreneurs invest more in the new equilibrium
¡
dkmax
dπ > 0 ∀ w ∈ [ ew1,∞)¢.
The distributional consequences of these adjustments are diﬀerent from those discussed above.
A large share of initial lenders is unaﬀected because of the constant interest rate. Only those
with a wealth endowment close to ew1 win as they can change occupation. Most notably,
however, there is no longer a distributional conflict between the entrepreneurs belonging to
the ”middle class” and the most aﬄuent entrepreneurs. They all win the same in absolute
terms because of the absence of indirect eﬀects of lower corruption. Note further that lowering
corruption in the (ρ∗ = r)−case increases aggregate output since additional capital units are
allocated to high-yield investment projects. To summarize (proof in the text),
Proposition 5 Consider an equilibrium with b(ρ∗) > 0 and ρ∗ = r. Then, a rise in π leaves
the initial lenders who may not change occupation unaﬀected. Those initial lenders who change
occupation and all initial entrepreneurs are better oﬀ.
Common to all cases treated so far is that the non-oﬃcials in the middle of the wealth
distribution (the ”middle class”) may lose a lot from a less severe prosecution of corruption
(i.e., a lower π). The poor cannot win from more corruption either. The situation is diﬀerent
for the most aﬄuent individuals. They win in absolute terms unless large sums of savings
13We could generate such a curve by, for instance, allowing for imperfect international capital mobility such
that a higher interest rate induces some capital inflows.
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are directed towards backyard projects and, consequently, credit supply decreases strongly.
According to the model, this reallocation of capital is more likely to take place at high levels
of corruption. Hence, the model predicts a hump-shaped relationship between the average ex
post wealth (i.e., the average income) of the richest part of the population and non-collusive
corruption. Increasing corruption from low levels is beneficial to the rich initially but may
reduce their ex post wealth beyond some point. This distributional pattern suggests a hump-
shaped relationship between the extent of (non-collusive) corruption and income inequality
which matches the empirical regularities found by Li et al. (2000).
5 Imperfect Goods Markets
Acting as a barrier to entry if access to credit is limited, corruption could have even stronger
distributive eﬀects for a reason that has previously been kept out of the analysis. In preventing
the poor from running a firm, higher corruption may alter the nature of competition on the
goods markets. In what follows we extend our basic model to formalize this idea.
To make the argument as simple as possible, we assume that there are only ”poor” and
”rich” potential entrepreneurs. The poor are endowed with wP = θK capital units, where
θ < 1, and the rich with wR = (2 − θ)K units so that - as above - aggregate capital is given
by K. The two groups are of equal size, 12 . Further, there exists a measure
1
2 of diﬀerentiated
goods from which the individuals derive utility according to the CES utility function
U =
⎡
⎢⎣
1/2Z
0
c
σ−1
σ
j dj
⎤
⎥⎦
σ
σ−1
, σ > 1, (8)
where cj is consumption of good j.
Each good j ∈ [0, 12 ] can be produced by exactly one poor and one rich individual. We
assume Cournot competition if both individuals enter a particular market. Otherwise, if only
the rich agent runs a firm, he may set monopoly prices. The technology is similar to that in
the previous sections except that we normalize R to 1 for ease of exposition. For the same
reason, we do no longer assume the existence of backyard projects. Further, we impose κ < K.
The market demand for good j can be calculated as
cj (pj) =
³pj
P
´−σ Y
P
,
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where pj is the price of good j, P =
hR 1/2
0 p
1−σ
j dj
i1/(1−σ)
is the CES price index, and Y denotes
aggregate output. The price elasticity of demand is given by σ > 1. We normalize the price
index to 21/(σ−1) such that all prices equal 1 in a symmetric equilibrium. Thus, we have
cj (pj) = 2Y p
−σ
j . (9)
The equilibrium on a particular goods market j requires cj to be equal to kjR + kjP , the sum
of the quantities produced by the rich and the poor entrepreneur, respectively.
The ex post wealth of an entrepreneur is given by
pjkji − ρ (kji − (wi − b)) (10)
where kji denotes the investment of entrepreneur i ∈ {P,R} in market j. The entrepreneurs
maximize their ex post wealth function subject to the borrowing constraint
kji ≤ wi − b+
λ
ρ
pjkji, (11)
where λρpjkji denotes the maximum amount of credit,
14 and subject to the minimum investment
constraint kji ≥ κ. Given that these two restrictions do not bind, the quantities are determined
by the first order condition
pj −
1
σ
pj (kjR + kjP )
−1 kji − ρ = 0. (12)
Equation (12) can be obtained by using the inverse demand function in the objective function
(10) and then diﬀerentiating with respect to kjR holding kjP constant, and vice versa.
We now consider two polar equilibria. First, we characterize the symmetric duopoly equi-
librium (i.e., the equilibrium in which the poor and the rich produce the same quantities)
with absent corruption due to a high probability of being detected and punished. Second, we
analyze a monopoly equilibrium in which π is lower (but all other parameters are unchanged)
such that the optimal bribe is positive and large enough to prevent the poor from entering
the markets. We are then ready to assess the change in incomes as we move from the second
(high-corruption) equilibrium to the first (low-corruption) equilibrium.
Symmetric Duopoly (with b = 0). Suppose that the poor and the rich have entered the
markets and that all entrepreneurs are unconstrained in equilibrium such that the quantities are
14As in the previous sections, the maximum amount of credit can be calculated by setting the repayment
obligation equal to the cost of default, λpjkji.
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entirely determined by equation (12). Then, it follows from the symmetry in preferences and
technology that the equilibrium is symmetric across goods markets j and that kjR = kjP = K.
In addition, since the price index has been normalized to 21/(σ−1), all goods prices equal 1.
Using this symmetry result in equation (12) yields
1− 1
2σ
= ρ. (13)
It remains to check under which condition the symmetric duopoly will be the equilibrium
outcome. The necessary condition for the symmetric duopoly to arise is that the poor can
aﬀord to invest K capital units. Inserting kjP = K and ρ = 1 − 12σ into the borrowing
constraint (11) results in
1− λ 2σ
2σ − 1 ≤ θ. (14)
Obviously, the poor are more likely to invest K capital units if the credit contracts are well
enforced (high λ), if there is low inequality (high θ), or if the mark-ups are high (low σ).
How must the expected punishment function look like in order to have b = 0? An oﬃcial
will never demand a positive bribe if the probability of being detected is high and/or the
punishment (in case of detection) increases strongly in the bribe right from the beginning.
More formally, a suﬃcient condition for the optimal bribe to be zero is that π > 1µ0(0) , and the
symmetric duopoly case is the equilibrium outcome as long condition (14) holds.
Note that the poor borrow from the rich in this equilibrium and that - since the interest
rate lies below the goods prices - the former can appropriate a rent on each unit borrowed.
Monopoly (with b > 0). Let us now consider the monopoly case in which only the rich run
a firm (kjP = 0) and in which the oﬃcials demand a positive bribe in equilibrium. Provided
that the rich are not credit rationed, the first order condition (12) holds with equality.15 Using
the same symmetry argument as above and remembering that - in a symmetric equilibrium -
all goods prices equal 1, equation (12) reduces to
1− 1
σ
= ρ. (15)
Thus, the equilibrium interest rate is lower (so that the mark-up is higher) in the monopoly
case. Obviously, the monopoly equilibrium is sustainable if the poor are not able to finance the
15A suﬃcient condition for the entrepreneurs not to be credit rationed is b/K < 1− θ + λ.
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minimum investment of κ capital units in order to enter the markets. To check under which
condition entry is not feasible for the poor, suppose that a poor individual enters the market j
by investing exactly an amount of κ. Then, given the behavior of the incumbent, the price of
good j would be given by
¡
2K+κ
2K
¢−1/σ
. Inserting this expression into the borrowing constraint
(11), we get that the monopolistic industry structure is indeed the equilibrium if the condition
κ
Ã
1− λ σ
σ − 1
µ
2K
2K + κ
¶1/σ!
> θK − b (16)
holds. Condition (16) is more likely to be satisfied if the bribe b is high, if the credit contracts
are not well enforced (low λ), and if the relative wealth of the poor is small (low θ). Hence,
it is the combination of non-collusive corruption and limited access to credit that may hinder
poor (but talented) individuals from undertaking high-yield investment projects.
With a monopolistic industry structure, the probability that a particular jurisdiction ”har-
bors” a rich entrepreneur is 12 . Then, in an equilibrium with corruption, the optimal bribe is
determined by 12 − πµ0(b) = 0. Hence, the inequality π <
1
2µ0(0) must hold, and we conclude
that - for a given punishment function µ(b) and with all other parameters unchanged - the
probability of being detected and punished must be lower than in the case discussed above.
In contrast to the symmetric duopoly regime, the rich borrow from the poor in this type
of equilibrium. Moreover, since the interest rate is even lower with monopolies, the rich can
appropriate a comparatively high rent on each capital unit they borrow.
Distributional Consequences of Corruption. How does the ex post wealth of the rich
change if b falls from a positive level to 0 so that the economy switches from the monopoly
equilibrium to the symmetric duopoly equilibrium? As discussed above, we may think of such
a switch as induced by a sharp rise in π.
We use the objective function (10) and the equations (15) and (13), respectively, to calculate
the rich individuals’ ex post wealth in the monopoly case (M) and in the duopoly case (D):
WE(wR)
¯¯
M
= 2K −
µ
1− 1
σ
¶
· (θK + b)
WE(wR)
¯¯
D
= K +
µ
1− 1
2σ
¶
· (1− θ)K.
Disregarding the bribe payment for the moment, it is clear that the rich are better oﬀ in the
monopoly case. The reason is that they borrow at a very low rate in the former case whereas
they are in the unfavorable position of a lender in the latter case. Moreover, the diﬀerence
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between WE(wR)
¯¯
M
and WE(wR)
¯¯
D
increases as σ falls. Hence, a rich individual’s loss is the
larger the less the diﬀerentiated goods can be substituted against each other.
Of course, whether the rich lose from the switch in the end depends on the level of the
bribe in the monopoly case. If π is very low such that the oﬃcials appropriate a large part
of the rents, the switch may also be beneficial to the rich. However, if the optimal bribe is
comparatively low and suﬃces just to prevent the poor from entering, the rich may lose a lot.
So, very similar to the result obtained in the previous section, we receive that the rich may
win if corruption decreases from some very high level but lose otherwise. The losses are the
higher, the higher the mark-up in the monopoly equilibrium has been.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
We provide suggestive evidence that persistent non-collusive corruption is widespread in low-
income countries but less prevalent in richer economies. Moreover, it seems that non-collusive
corruption imposes a substantial cost on economic activity. The puzzle then is why this type
of corruption is so common in the poorer parts of the world. The purpose of the present
paper is to address this question from a macroeconomic perspective. We consider a general
equilibrium model with credit market imperfections and heterogeneous agents. It appears that
both an unequal wealth distribution and market imperfections, chiefly on the credit market,
are important characteristics of poor economies.
Our analysis provides two main results. First, credit market imperfections generate rents
for the incumbent entrepreneurs. The existence of such rents allows an oﬃcial with discre-
tionary authority to extract bribes since the return to the incumbent’s alternative investment
opportunity is much lower. In an economy with (nearly) perfect markets, however, the returns
are equalized across investment opportunities, and asking for bribes easily induces a particular
entrepreneur not to enter the market. As a consequence, a dishonest oﬃcial will not demand
bribes in such an environment even if he faces the same (perhaps low) probability of being
detected and punished as in an economy suﬀering from strong market imperfections. Put dif-
ferently, the model implies that economies with a less developed financial system tend to suﬀer
from higher levels of non-collusive corruption (as measured by the frequency of bribing or by
the average bribe) than countries with a near-perfect financial system - even if the countries
attach the same priority to the prosecution of corruption. Interestingly, however, reducing
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financial market imperfections does not unambiguously deplete the level of corruption. If con-
tract enforcement starts improving from a low level, the situation may actually become worse.
Only after contract enforcement has reached some threshold level, even better enforcement
lowers the level of corruption.
The second result is that non-collusive corruption redistributes income not only from non-
oﬃcials towards oﬃcials but also within the group of non-oﬃcials. We find that the members
of the ”middle class” are hurt substantially whereas the poor lose little. By contrast, the rich
entrepreneurs may win despite the fact that they bear a large part of the direct costs. The
reason is that own wealth plays the role of a collateral under imperfect credit. Higher bribes
reduce the value of the collateral such that some potential entrepreneurs - most likely those in
the middle of the wealth distribution - are no longer able to finance the set-up of a production
plant. But this is to the benefit of those who may enter the market anyway. The cost of capital
goes down and, probably, there is less competition on the product markets.
These distributional consequences oﬀer a political-economy perspective on non-collusive
corruption. The most aﬄuent entrepreneurs probably understand that non-collusive corruption
acts as a barrier preventing less aﬄuent (but not very poor) individuals with high-return
projects from entering the credit and the goods market; potentially, the rich are willing to
accept persistent corruption or may even try to block a reform of the bureaucracy or the
judiciary for this reason. Hence, even if a well-intentioned government perfectly knew the
appropriate steps against corruption, it might have diﬃculties to start reforms if political
power is concentrated in the hands of the economic elite.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.
The second derivative of the objective function is given by
−∂ ew
∂b
µ
2G0 +G00
∂ ew
∂b
b
¶
− πµ00, (A1)
where
∂ ew
∂b
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
1
(1−λ)R
R−ρ ≥ 1
:
:
ew1 ≥ ew2ew1 < ew2 .
In order to make sure that the oﬃcials’ maximization problem has a unique solution on the
interval [0,∞) we have to check whether the second derivative of the objective function is
negative whenever the first order condition has an interior solution. Hence, solving equation
(6) for b and using this result in equation (A1) yields
− 1
G0
∙
∂ ew
∂b
³
2
¡
G0
¢2
+G00 · ¡1−G− πµ0¢´+ πµ00G0¸ < 0.
Obviously, the above inequality holds if G00 ≥ 0 since 1−G−πµ0 > 0 (equation 6) and πµ(b) is
a strictly convex function. But it might become positive if G00 is smaller than zero. However,
because of the assumption that the hazard rate G0/(1 − G) is non-decreasing in ew, we have
(G0)2 +G00 · (1−G) ≥ 0. Accordingly, the second order condition is satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Note first that KD goes to infinity as ρ approaches λR. To see this, let ρ = λR. Then,
according to the equations (3) and (5), we have ew = ew1 = ew2 = b(λR). Moreover, by Lemma
2, a positive mass of individuals has a wealth endowment that exceeds the threshold levelew = b(λR). Hence, a positive fraction of the population is able to borrow infinitely large
amounts of capital and is indeed induced to do so since R > λR. Completely parallel reasoning
shows that capital demand is infinite in case of ρ < λR as well. Note that, by equation (6) and
Lemma 2, b(λR) will be positive if the condition
1−G(0)− πµ0(0) = 1− πµ0(0) > 0. (A2)
holds.
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In order derive a restriction on the exogenous parameters that ensures ew1 > ew2 in case of
ρ > λR we have to calculate the respective derivatives
d ew1
dρ
= κ
λR
ρ2
+
db
dρ
and (A3)
d ew2
dρ
=
(1− λ)R
(R− ρ)2
b+
(1− λ)R
R− ρ
db
dρ
,
where
db
dρ
= −
h
G0 +G00 ∂ ew∂b b
i
∂ ew
∂ρ +G
0 ∂2 ew
∂b∂ρbh
2G0 +G00 ∂ ew∂b b
i
∂ ew
∂b + πµ
00
< 0 (A4)
as long as the optimal bribe is positive. As in the proof of Lemma (2), the sign of dbdρ can be
determined by substituting for the optimal b in equation (A4) and then using the monotone
hazard rate condition. Now, given condition (ii), there exists a ρ0 ∈ (λR,R) that solves
1 − G
³
κ
n
1− λRρ
o´
− πµ0(0) = 0 if condition (A2) holds. To put it another way, ρ0 is the
interest rate that leads exactly to an optimal bribe of 0 in case of ew1 > ew2 - provided that
condition (A2) is satisfied. Otherwise, if 1 − πµ0(0) ≤ 0, we take the following definition:
ρ0 ≡ λR.
Using the equations (17) and (A4) and the definition of ρ0, we can immediately derive that
(1− λ)R
(R− ρ0)2
b(λR) < κ
λR
(ρ0)
2 =⇒
d ew2
dρ
<
d ew1
dρ
for ρ ∈ [λR, ρ0].
Hence, we have ew = ew1 as ρ rises from λR to ρ0. Then, if ρ ∈ [ρ0, R], the optimal bribe is zero
and we have ew = ew1 in any event. Consequently, if the condition
κ > κ =
(1− λ)R
(R− ρ0)2
(ρ0)
2
λR
b(λR)
is met, we have ew = ew1 > ew2 for ρ > λR.
Suppose now that κ > κ. Then,
db
dρ
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
− G0+G00b2G0+G00b+πµ00
λR
ρ2 κ
0
:
:
ρ ∈ [λR, ρ0)
ρ ∈ [ρ0, R]
,
and it follows immediately that d ew1dρ > 0 and that dkmaxdρ < 0. But this means that gross capital
demand falls monotonically as ρ rises from λR to R. At ρ = R, the potential entrepreneurs
are indiﬀerent between borrowing and lending since (i) the marginal product of capital equals
capital costs and (ii) the optimal bribe is zero. Hence, the KD-curve is horizontal. Finally,
gross capital demand is zero for interest rates that exceed R.
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Proof of Lemma 4.
The derivatives of ew1 and kmax with respect to π are given by
d ew1
dπ
=
µ
∂b
∂ρ
+ κ
λR
ρ2
¶
dρ
dπ
+
∂b
∂π
and
dkmax
dπ
= −
³
∂b
∂ρ + k
max λR
ρ2
´
dρ
dπ +
∂b
∂π
1− λRρ
,
respectively. From above, we know that dρdπ > 0,
∂b
∂ρ < 0, and
∂b
∂π < 0. Suppose now that
d ew1
dπ ≥ 0 such that
dkmax
dπ < 0 for all k
max > κ. Then, gross capital demand must decrease in
equilibrium since the fraction of entrepreneurs is smaller (or unchanged) and the remaining
entrepreneurs invest less capital. However, this is a contradiction since gross capital demand
is constant in equilibrium with ρ∗ > r. We conclude that d ew1dπ < 0. This, in turn, implies that
dkmax( ew1)
dπ > 0 since k
max( ew1) = κ. However, as kmax is an increasing aﬃne-linear function of w
(equation 2), there exists a bw such that dkmaxdπ < 0 for w > bw.
Proof of Proposition 2.
At λ = 0, the capital demand equation equals
R∞
max{ ew1, ew2} {w − b(ρ)}G0(w)dw < K because
b(ρ) > 0. Hence, for low levels of λ, the equilibrium interest rate ρ equals r.
Case ρ = r. Consider an increase in λ. Denote the initial wealth to become entrepreneur
by w¯. Then, given b, ew decreases and gross capital demand (7) increases. Let us turn to the
optimization problem of the oﬃcial: The decrease in ew implies that the optimal bribe b must
rise. However, the oﬃcial will increase the bribe b only to a level such that ew < w¯. Otherwise,
(6) would be violated: If b is set such that ew < w¯, 1 − G(w¯) < G0(w¯)∂w¯∂b b + πµ0(b). Further,
we know that the investment level kmax is monotonic in w. Hence kmax(w¯) > kmax( ew) = κ.
Together with d2kmax/ (dλdw) > 0, this implies that all previous entrepreneurs increase their
firm sizes, given ρ. Taken together, an increase in λ leads to an increase in the bribe level b, a
decrease in ew, and an increase in gross capital demand. Since ρ = r, the equilibrium amount
of capital invested rises (until K is reached).
Case ρ > r and ew1 > ew2. If capital demand crosses capital supply in the vertical segment,
the right shift of the capital demand schedule causes ρ to rise. Assume ew1 is relevant. From
(2) and (3) we see that the investment level kmax(w) and the minimum wealth level ew1 to
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become entrepreneur are functions of λ/ρ only. In addition, λ does not enter the first order
condition of the oﬃcial (6) separately. But this implies that the system (7) and (6) has only
one solution for λ/ρ and b. Hence, the bribe level remains constant as λ increases.
Case ρ > r and ew2 > ew1. By diﬀerentiating (5) we see that ew2 increases when λ and ρ
increase proportionally. In particular, ew2 approaches infinity at λ < 1 if λ/ρ is fixed. Hence,ew2 becomes eventually relevant as λ approaches 1. In that case, a further increase of λ will
increase ew2. To show this, assume the contrary. For ew2 to decrease, ρ must increase less
than proportionally with λ. Hence kmax(w) increases, given b. The decrease in ew2 triggers an
increase of the bribe b. However, the investment level of the critical entrepreneur must rise,
since (1 − λ)kmax( ew2) = ρ ew2 holds and ρ has risen. Since d2kmax/ (dλdw) > 0 equilibrium
investment of the richer entrepreneurs rises even more, hence this cannot be an equilibrium.
We conclude that ew2 must increase and correspondingly b decrease.
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Tables  
 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Rank correlations between different measures of corruption 
      
measure for non-collusive 
corruption 1     
measure for collusive 
corruption 0.56 1    
TI 2001 0.82 0.58 1   
TI 88-91 (average) 0.82 0.58 0.87 1  
TI 80-85 (average)  0.8 0.57 0.82 0.87 1 
Sources: TI indices: Transparency International Global Corruption Report, 2001 and Transparency 
International and Göttingen University, www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/histor.htm (historical data); Measures 
for collusive and non-collusive corruption: own calculations based on “The World Business 
Environment Survey (WBES) 2000.”  
Note: Measure for non-collusive corruption: Share of firms responding “never” or “seldom” when 
asked whether it is common for firms in their line of business to have to pay some irregular additional 
payments to get things done; Measure for collusive corruption: Share of firms responding “0%” or “up 
to 5%” when asked how much of the contract value a firm in their line of business would typically 
offer in additional or unofficial payments to secure the contract when doing business with the 
government; the TI index measures the “perception of corruption” and ranges between 0 (highly 
corrupt) and 10 (highly clean). 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Dependent Variable: TI 2001 CPI 
Constant Measure for non-collusive corruption 
Measure for collusive 
corruption 
0.41 
(0.34) 
5.95* 
(0.65) 
1.48* 
(0.55) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Figures  
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Economic Development and Non-Collusive Corruption 
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Sources: Measures for collusive and non-collusive corruption: own calculations based on World 
Bank (2002); GDP data: Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002). 
Note: The range of the measure for non-collusive corruption is [0,1], with 1 indicating least 
corruption.  Log GDP per capita is measured in 1996 constant prices.  
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Figure 2 – Capital Market Equilibrium  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Ex Post Wealth 
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Figure 4 – Corruption and the Interest Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Impact of Lower Corruption on the Ex Post Wealth 
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